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Since 2003 public–private partnerships (PPPs) have
represented between 10 and 13.5% of the total investment
in public services in the UK. The macro-economic and
political beneﬁts of PPPs were among the key drivers for
central government’s decision to promote this form of
procurement to improve UK public services. Political
support for a PPP project is critical and is frequently cited
as the most important critical success factor. This paper
investigates the signiﬁcance of political support and reviews
the treatment of political risk in a business case by the
public sector project sponsor for major UK-based light rail
transit PPP projects during their development stage. The
investigation demonstrates that in the early project stages
it is not traditional quantitative Monte Carlo risk analysis
that is important; rather it is the identiﬁcation and
representation of political support within a business case
together with an understanding of how this information is
then used to inform critical project decisions.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main driver to the evolution of the current UK public–
private partnerships (PPP) was the Conservative government’s
privatisation programme, which was intensiﬁed by the 1981
Ryrie rules and the 1992 private ﬁnance initiative (PFI); this
background is well known and reported in many texts,1–4 and
hence will not be repeated here. Between April 1987 and
December 2006, £55 billion of private capital equating to 794
projects was invested under PPP across 20 public sector
departments within local and central government, representing
from 2003 onwards, between 10 and 13.5% of total investment
in public services. Since 1987, £22 billion of private capital has
been invested in the UK PPP transport sector of which 85% has
been invested in 16 rail projects.
PPPs have been successfully used by central government in the
UK to deliver improvements in public services, including light
rail transit (LRT) projects such as in Croydon which is shown in
Fig. 1. There have, however, been failures and PPPs are not
universally beneﬁcial to all sectors and/or all projects as
demonstrated by the collapse of the consortium Metronet5 and
underperforming LRTs.6 This is particularly noticeable because
the private sector’s ability to borrow money and the rate of
interest that is charged are directly dependent upon the
perception of political support for the project. Empirically, this
issue was highlighted in July 2004 when three LRTs (Manchester
phase 3, Leeds SuperTram and South Hampshire Rapid Transit)
were revoked by the secretary of state for transport for
‘modestly’ exceeding affordability targets in comparison with
London Underground Limited’s (LUL’s) PPP that ‘signiﬁcantly’
exceeded intended affordability targets.7 With each of the LRT
projects, sponsors promoted the project believing they had full
political support with their business case and project; however,
this evidence suggests some projects are politically more
supported than others.
Political risk, its analysis and management in an international
business context has been the focus of signiﬁcant attention in
literature for over two decades and still remains a signiﬁcant
business and project issue. This early work was focused on the
private sector investor rather than the public sector sponsor and
on international rather than domestic business. However,
importantly two conclusions can be drawn
(a) researchers have been unable to reach a consensus on a clear
deﬁnition for political risk due to diversity of risks and its
sources8
(b) political risk is not easily quantiﬁed and included in an
objective manner in a decision-making framework.9
Political support and the evaluation and communication of the
political risk associated with the degree of support for a public
sector PPP project is fundamental to achieving a successful PPP
project outcome. This is more so during the development stage
of a project through to contract signature. This paper
concentrates on the political information required within a
business case to assess the level of political support and
associated risk with this support. This topic was a single, critical
aspect of a larger research project that involved developing and
testing an ideal business case to facilitate successful decision
making for PPP LRT projects.1
2. ISSUES WITH DEFINING AND EVALUATING
POLITICAL RISK
According to Kettis10 political risk is difﬁcult to clarify due to
the fact that it is a phenomenon present in the interface
between an organisation and a political environment and
involves the concepts of risk and uncertainty, political sources
and political environments. At a general level political risk is
‘an implicitly unwanted political activity’11 and has been
classiﬁed under two categories; risks arising from government
action and risks arising from government and societal events.12
Political risk is frequently referred to in an operational business
context or in relation to foreign direct investment (FDI).13,14
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Furthermore, political risk has been broadly deﬁned as the risk
arising from adverse interference of central government on an
organisation’s business operations (i.e. forced divestment,
conﬁscation of assets or expropriation) or as a result of political
decisions (i.e. changes in taxation or policy) or societal events
(i.e. strikes, terrorism, protests or kidnapping) impacting on an
investment already made in that country that results in reduced
returns, major losses or managerial control.
Sethi and Luther14 strongly advocate the problem with
identifying and evaluating political risks that arises from the
lack of attention to political concepts and the weak deﬁnitions
that do not capture the breadth of the problem. In literature
political risk has been used to group political events that affect
business decisions, and all too often are associated with political
instability rather than other forms of political risk. They
strongly argue it is the lack of clarity with the political risk
deﬁnition that leads to inappropriate analysis and interpretation
of ﬁndings.
Political risk analysis is often conducted using a combination of
qualitative and quantitative techniques.10,15 Qualitative methods
include grand tours, expert opinions (or old hands), checklists,
inﬂuence diagrams, scenarios or Delphi technique. Quantitative
methods include statistical analyses such as multivariate
analysis, and stochastic methods including Monte Carlo
simulation11,16,17 or multi-criteria analysis such as analytical
hierarchical process18 or predicting using artiﬁcial neural
networks.19 According to Pahud de Mortanges and Allers11 who
investigated political risk assessment techniques in Dutch ﬁrms,
industry tended towards qualitative unstructured methods for
evaluation that include intuition, judgement and expert opinion
rather than more traditional quantitative techniques. Sethi and
Luther14 argue that political risk analysis is frequently hampered
by biased data due to interviewees responding guardedly to
sensitive questions, censorship of published reports, and
frequent ‘bad’ information being hidden. Sethi and Luther14
then raise problems with analysis and interpretation that
include: limited applicability of the past being projected into the
future; a lack of consensus over representation of variables; and
treatment of risk models as ‘black boxes’ being a substitute for
reality. Inappropriate methods of identifying, evaluating and
perceiving political risk could cause the project to become
unbankable.
3. THE BUSINESS CASE, POLITICAL INFORMATION
AND DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT
One of the key components of a business case is the risk
associated with the investment. With PPP projects risks are
frequently classiﬁed into two categories: project risks and
general risks.20 Project risks are those speciﬁc to the project’s
micro-environment and include such risks arising from the
technical, contractual, management and site conditions. General
risks are those arising from the project’s macro-environment.
General risks have a signiﬁcant impact on the outcome of the
project and include legal, political, economic, social or
technological risks. It is recognised by PPP project sponsors that
the most signiﬁcant general risk to a project is political risk.
Whereas project risk is identiﬁed, quantiﬁed and assessed to
form part of the business cases (value for money) for decision
making, it is the general risks such as political risk that are
not.21–23 Some project sponsors have experienced problems in
identifying and representing political information that is
political support for a project, within a project’s business case
and using this information to make decisions on the political
risk associated with a project. In many instances there is a
tendency for project sponsors to focus on the quantiﬁable
aspects for the business case for decision making and keep the
qualitative political information for decision making outside of
the business case. Fundamentally, a project’s business case is
used as a tool to support project decision making and planning.
The ideal PPP business case structure, developed by Gannon,1 is
comprised of strategic- and tactical-level information and a
critical success factor (CSF) reporting structure. Strategic-level
CSFs are factors that originate from the organisation’s internal
and external environment and are utilised for corporate decision
making. Tactical-level CSFs are project-related factors that
comprise forecast business case components developed by the
project team and characteristics of the project team and their
methods/systems of working. Information deﬁning the degree of
political ‘support’ for the project is a critical component of the
strategic-level information category, and the risk associated
with this support is the project’s political risk (Fig. 2). This is a
strategic-level risk that can have a signiﬁcant impact on the
public sector organisation and its objective to develop and
Fig. 1. Croydon Tramlink – a 99-year PPP lease (photograph
courtesy of Peter Courtenay)
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Fig. 2. The business case, political information and decision-
making in context1
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deliver the PPP project. Strategic risks are different from
traditional project risks in that they are a series of connected
dynamic processes rather than events, strongly linked to people
and culture and consequently need to be identiﬁed, predicted
and managed differently from traditional risk analysis
techniques.24
Clearly, it is essential for good and transparent decision making
that a robust and credible business case containing the best
possible project information is prepared otherwise poor
decisions will be made resulting in signiﬁcant wasted time and
cost for the public and private sector. Therefore, it follows that
the content and structure of a business case needs to provide
sufﬁcient critical project information, including political
information, as necessary, to facilitate a successful project
decision.
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As part of the larger study,1 ‘unsanitised’ project data,
information and documentation were extracted from two
detailed LRT PPP case studies and four partial LRT PPP case
studies but these have to remain conﬁdential. Critical success
factors (CSFs) were identiﬁed using a case study methodology.
A two-phased analytical hierarchical process (AHP) was then
used to assess the effectiveness of business case CSFs in
decision making with the project affordability decision. The
business case was then re-engineered using business process re-
engineering. Veriﬁcation and validation of the ideal business
case were subsequently undertaken using the Delphi technique.
For AHP phase one, 12 PPP experts (four each from a group of
project sponsors, consultants and advisors, and corporate
decision makers) were interviewed and for phase two nine PPP
experts (three from each of phase one’s group). During the
Delphi exercise nine PPP experts were identiﬁed using
purposive and snowball sampling, comprising six from industry
(four public sector and two private sector) and three from
academia. The experts were invited to provide their opinions to
verify and validate the ideal PPP business case, a key
component of this being the CSF reporting structure. Each
expert for the AHP phase one and two and Delphi study had
between ﬁve and 12 years’ PPP experience gained from
developing, advising or researching PPP projects – seven
experts in rail-based projects and two experts in education and
health based PPP projects. The ﬁndings from this study that are
relevant to political risk are discussed below.
5. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLITICAL
INFORMATION IN DECISION MAKING
Twenty-three CSFs (with 106 sub-factors) were identiﬁed from
the case studies as being necessary for realistic and successful
decision making. Political information was represented by a
‘political perspective’ CSF which contained two sub-factors: one
providing information on the ‘political support and
commitment’ for the project explicitly communicated by central
government to the project sponsor; and the other the ‘DfT
priority’ to demonstrate the signiﬁcance of the project from the
viewpoint of the Department for Transport (DfT). Both these
sub-factors are critical to the business case when seeking
approval by the sponsors for funding or progression of the
project to the next stage by the secretary of state for transport.
After identifying CSFs the AHP was utilised in conjunction with
Kendall’s coefﬁcient of concordance to assess association
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Fig. 3. Effectiveness of political information in decision making1
Management, Procurement and Law 161 Issue MP4 Political risk in light rail transit PPP projects Smith . Gannon 181
between ﬁndings.25 During the ﬁrst AHP phase, 11 out of 12
respondents ranked political perspective within their three
top-ranked factors (Fig. 3). Eight of these respondents had
ranked this factor as the most critical factor in the decision-
making process. There was a more than 40% increase in the
weighting of the political perspective mean priority vector
(weighting by AHP) compared with the nearest CSF. Most
respondents stressed the importance of political support with the
project and how this can change and impact on a project over
time, a force driven by the government’s transport policy and
priorities.
Although it was stated by one respondent that ‘lots of cities
want LRT but it really depends on the government’s view at the
time, they blow hot and cold; 1 year pro tram and the next pro
guided bus-way’, respondents stressed the importance of
political support needed to ‘get the project off the ground’.
However, to achieve this political backing it was necessary for
sponsors to have a robust and credible business case to present
to political stakeholders in the ﬁrst instance.
After a detailed review and analysis of transcribed documents
resulting from AHP phase one, the political perspective CSF was
developed further to distinguish between central and local
government sub-factors that were critical to PPP projects and
business case decision making. The central government
information included: project ﬁt with policy and priorities,
ﬁnancial commitment to project, political support (original CSF
in phase one) link with major projects politically supported/
committed. Local government information included: project ﬁt
with policy and priorities, ﬁnancial commitment and political
support with project. A second AHP phase with nine
respondents was undertaken with the nine most critical CSFs
from AHP phase one; the leading result unsurprisingly was
political perspective CSF as shown in Fig. 4.
All respondents, bar one, ranked political perspective as their
top priority, the exception ranking it equal ﬁrst to sponsors
perspective, on the basis that the sponsoring organisation needs
to understand the business case and project internally unless a
strong political policy dictat is being given with the project, as
was the case with LUL’s PPP.
All respondents ranked central government as their top priority
followed by local government. This was on the basis that local
government was dependent on central government for its
ﬁnance and policies. Within central government, ‘ﬁnancial
commitment with project’ was followed by ‘link with major
projects already supported/committed by central government’,
‘political support with project’, ‘project ﬁt with policies and
priorities’ (Fig. 5). Respondents’ priority vectors and rankings for
CSFs, as shown in Fig. 5 and Kendall’s coefﬁcient of
concordance (W ) were calculated; a positive association existed
for CSFs with W ¼ 0.52.1
Within local government the overall rankings by respondents
were ‘ﬁnancial commitment to a project’, ‘political support with
a project’ and ‘project ﬁt with policies and priorities’ (Fig. 5).
Generally respondents ranked ‘political support over project ﬁt’
with ‘policy and priorities’ as projects that seemed to ‘press all
the policy buttons’ but do not have political support and are left
to languish. However, with London-based projects it was
evident that a link with a major project already politically
committed was more signiﬁcant than having support with a
project by central government. ‘Political support’ was the most
important factor followed by ‘affordability’ and the ﬁt with the
‘corporate strategy’ and ‘policies and priorities’. Respondents
viewed policies and project priorities as changeable within their
organisation so ranked these the lowest CSF in decision making.
A respondent from one local authority ranked capital
investment programmes according to each project’s ﬁt with
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local government’s policies and priorities; projects with low
rankings are fast-tracked to the top of the investment
programme due to political reasons. Although political support
can be quite strong for projects, one respondent indicated that
‘at the end of the day it is all about politicians, councillors
essentially, and if necessary they will rewrite all the policies to
give the answer they want’.1
6. DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT AND THE
BUSINESS CASE
As a result of verifying and validating the ideal business case
using the Delphi technique, experts expressed their opinions
that were strongly focused on the political support for projects
assessing political risk and the value and limitation of
representing political information within the business case for
decision making.
Political support and the risk associated with this support from
central government was a critical issue for sponsors during
development. Political support was evident at two levels: local
government support and central government support through
members of parliament (MPs). At the early development stage of
a PPP project signiﬁcant emphasis was input by the project
sponsor into gaining central and local government political
support with the project, as without this support there was no
project despite a technically sound business case. Once these
two levels of political support had been gained, the project
sponsor would then focus on the PPP transaction and the
marketplace and update politicians on progress.
Despite project sponsors and advisors developing credible and
robust business cases conforming to DfT’s and Her Majesty’s
Treasury’s (HMT) PPP business case best practices, they were
still prone to political uncertainty even though, in some cases,
the DfT informed sponsors they had political support and
ﬁnancial commitment to their project. One PPP expert stressed
transport projects in the UK were nearly always politically
driven; technical people invent them but projects never really
happen unless they have political support at the right level. It
was noted that political support was often swayed by
forthcoming elections and other sector priorities. Two kinds of
political support were identiﬁed by experts. Some PPP rail
projects in the UK had political ‘ticking over’ support by HMT,
whereby development funds were available to projects, albeit in
a steady stream. This often seemed to be the case when
elections were on the horizon. However, these projects never
appeared to progress on to the next stage and/or reach contract
signature. Whereas projects that had ‘genuine’ political support
from HMT, despite consuming signiﬁcant development funds
and changing the original funding objectives, managed to reach
contract signature.1 One expert stressed that genuine political
support is evident by HMT’s appetite for risk and funding PPP
projects and is often demonstrated by rapid decision making,
throwing money at projects or taking risks away from the
project to ensure the contract is signed.
Issues raised by many of the experts included how to assess
and express HMT’s ‘genuine’ political appetite for a project.
Being unable to include fully ‘committed’ political information
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for a project weakens strategic decision making, leaving
corporate decision makers having to make a decision on the
status of an unknown critical factor that is outside their control.
However, this is a risk frequently accepted by corporate decision
makers and sponsors believing they have, ‘genuine’ political
support when in reality they do not. In these instances an exit
strategy is essential to mitigate the risk of signiﬁcant wasted
funds and time in project development. PPP experts agreed that
it would be impossible to write this explicitly in a business case
or elsewhere, as it is as politically unacceptable to commit
support to a project which is not viable. It was suggested by one
expert that perhaps HMT commitment to a project could
perhaps be detected through ‘tell-tale’ signs such as: a link to a
major project of national economic importance already
supported (i.e. Heathrow Terminal 5, Olympics), positive
messages to the private sector, reimbursement of bid costs,
response to decision making or attending meetings by HMT and
DfT ofﬁcials.
Despite the lack of conﬁdence sponsors had in being able to
include ‘real’ political information in a business case, it was
clear that information for central government (‘project ﬁt with
policy and priorities’, ‘ﬁnancial commitment to the project’,
‘political support with the project’ and ‘link with major
projects politically supported or committed’) and the same for
local government could be identiﬁed and incorporated, as
shown in Table 1. The local government level information
should demonstrate the project ﬁt with local government
policies and priorities typically sourced from the authority’s
local transport plan (LTP), the ﬁve-year investment plan or
other strategic documents published by the local authority. The
level of ﬁnancial commitment provided to the project by the
local authority covering development and/or implementation
costs (annual proﬁle, total and present value) with a
supporting commentary is also beneﬁcial. To communicate the
position as clearly as possible, any conditions on the project
funding levels also need to be provided in a supporting
commentary.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the inherent riskiness associated
with the signiﬁcance of political support and hence for project
decision making for PPP LRT projects. Although traditional
Monte Carlo techniques are frequently used by sponsors to
evaluate project risk, they tend to be based on an input of hard
project risks, which are relatively easy to identify and quantify
but produce outputs that are insufﬁcient for realistic decision
making. The paper shows that for LRT infrastructure investment
projects, including the exemplar of LUL Tubelines PPP shown in
Fig. 6, it is the soft risks affecting the investment that are
critical to the project’s overall success or failure. The paper
clearly demonstrates the critical signiﬁcance of the soft risks in
general and of political support in particular, which is another
way of expressing political risk. Any misperception of risk can
cause lending rates to rise, creditworthiness to fall and adverse
conditions for the project to prevail.
Despite problems of conﬁdentiality and the pressures of public
accountability, the paper shows that ﬁnancial information on
central government’s ﬁnancial commitment required for a
business case includes development and/or implementation
costs (annual, total and PV) to the project (typically capital
grant) with a supporting commentary; a summary of the
political support for the project across the three major UK
political parties is also required; details of major project(s)
(dates, dependency) which the sponsor’s project is integral to
and already supported or committed to by government are
required. It is therefore signiﬁcant if political risks can be
identiﬁed and expressed more transparently; and this seems to
be undertaken most appropriately in the business case and used
for decision-making purposes. This process will reduce time and
cost in wasted project development. Critically this information
will allow project sponsors to formulate an exit strategy from
the project to mitigate political risks.
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